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1 Introduction
This paper studies the problem of fairly allocating an amount of a divisible resource
among agents whose preferences are single-peaked (Sprumont, 1991). An allocation
rule, or simply a rule, is a function which maps each single-peaked preference pro¯le
to an allocation. The fairness property of the rules we are interested in is envy-
freeness, which states that, at any chosen allocation, no one should prefer anyone
else's consumption to her own (Foley, 1967). The practicality condition we are
interested in is peak-only, which states that the choice of allocations should only
depend on the peaks of preferences. We say \practical," since the user of any peak-
only rule only needs information on peak amounts of individual preferences, instead
of all complicated details.
Our purpose is to study various envy-free and peak-only rules and to clarify
the structure of the set of those rules. We do not impose e±ciency, although our
main results are deeply related to it. The aim is to extract pure implications of
envy-freeness and peak-only as much as possible. However, it will turn out that the
absence of e±ciency does clarify the role of e±ciency in some existing results in the
literature, and in this sense, we are studying e±ciency.
We have two main theorems. In our ¯rst main theorem, we show that a rule is
envy-free and peak-only if and only if it satis¯es Kolm's strong fairness condition
of convex envy-freeness and some mild conditions, and also o®er a functional char-
acterization of any such rule. Furthermore, it is proved that the set of these rules
forms a complete lattice with respect to a dominance relation. In our second main
theorem, we impose strategy-proofness on envy-free and peak-only rules. We then
o®er a functional characterization of any such rule and prove that the set of these
rules also forms a complete lattice with respect to the dominance relation. In both
theorems, the unique upper (resp. lower) bound of the dominance relation is the
uniform (resp. equal division) rule, and any other rule lies between the two rules.
This implies that, in the choice problem of a rule from the set of these rules, there
is always the unanimous agreement that the uniform rule is the best and the equal
division rule is the worst.
Our work particularly follows the interesting works by Thomson (1994), Chun
(2000), and Kesten (2006). Thomson (1994) shows that the uniform rule is the only
e±cient, envy-free, and peak-only rule, and Chun (2000) shows that the uniform
rule is the only e±cient and convex envy-free rule. Our results give some insights
into the role of e±ciency in the list of their axioms, since the results do not rely on
e±ciency with keeping other axioms. Kesten (2006) shows that any envy-free and
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peak-only rule is convex envy-free. He also points out Paretian dominance relations
over the set of convex envy-free allocations. Our work can be seen as an extension
of his work that o®ers full characterizations of some convex envy-free rules and sets
of the rules.1
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 o®ers the model. Section 3
presents main results. Section 4 concludes the paper. Some proofs are relegated to
the Appendix.
2 Basic de¯nitions
2.1 Model
Let N ´ f1; 2; : : : ; ng be the ¯nite set of agents. There is a ¯xed amount of an
in¯nitely divisible resource ­ > 0 to be allocated. An allotment for i 2 N is
xi 2 [0;­]. An allocation is a vector of allotments x ´ (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) 2 [0;­]N such
that
P
i2N xi = ­. Let X be the set of allocations. Given x 2 X, let x ´ mini2N xi
and x ´ maxi2N xi.
A single-peaked preference is a transitive, complete, and continuous binary rela-
tion Ri over [0;­] for which there exists a unique point pi 2 [0;­] such that for each
xi; x
0
i 2 [0;­],
[x0i < xi · pi or pi · xi < x0i] =) xi Pi x0i;
where the symmetric and asymmetric parts of Ri are denoted by Ii and Pi, respec-
tively. The point pi is called the peak of Ri, and the pro¯le of peaks is denoted by
p ´ (p1; p2; : : : ; pn). Let R be the set of single-peaked preferences and RN the set
of single-peaked preference pro¯les R ´ (R1; R2; : : : ; Rn).
2.2 Axioms and rules
A rule is a function f : RN ! X which maps a preference pro¯le R 2 RN to an
allocation f(R) ´ (f1(R); f2(R); : : : ; fn(R)) 2 X. Let F be the set of rules. The
following axioms of rules are standard:
² E±ciency : An allocation x 2 X is e±cient for R 2 RN if Pi2N pi · ­
implies p 5 x and
P
i2N pi ¸ ­ implies p = x. A rule f is e±cient if for each
R 2 RN , f(R) is e±cient for R.
1We thank the associate editor for raising our attention to Kesten's paper.
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² Envy-freeness (Foley, 1967): An allocation x 2 X is envy-free for R 2 RN if
for each i; j 2 N , xi Ri xj. A rule f is envy-free if for each R 2 RN , f(R) is
envy-free for R.
² Convex envy-freeness (Kolm, 1973): An allocation x 2 X is convex envy-free
for R 2 RN if for each i 2 N and each a 2 [x; x], xi Ri a. A rule f is convex
envy-free if for each R 2 RN , f(R) is convex envy-free for R.
² Peak-only : For each R;R0 2 RN with p = p0, f(R) = f(R0).
² Strategy-proofness: For each R 2 RN , each i 2 N , and each R0i 2 R, fi(R) Ri
fi(R
0
i; R¡i).
² Non-bossiness : For each R 2 RN , each i 2 N , and each R0i 2 R, if fi(R) =
fi(R
0
i; R¡i), then f(R) = f(R
0
i; R¡i).
We also introduce much weaker versions of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness,
which only concern preferences with unchanged peaks. They are also trivially im-
plied by peak-only.
² Strategy-proofness for same peaks : For each R 2 RN , each i 2 N , and each
R0i 2 R with pi = p0i, fi(R) Ri fi(R0i; R¡i).
² Non-bossiness for same peaks : For each R 2 RN , each i 2 N , and each R0i 2 R
with pi = p
0
i, if fi(R) = fi(R
0
i; R¡i), then f(R) = f(R
0
i; R¡i).
Since the seminal works by Benassy (1982) and Sprumont (1991), the following
rule has played the central role in the literature.2 It satis¯es all the axioms de¯ned
above:
Uniform rule, U : For each R 2 RN and each i 2 N ,
Ui(R) ´
(
minfpi; ¸g if
P
j2N pj ¸ ­;
maxfpi; ¸g if
P
j2N pj · ­;
where ¸ solves
P
j2N Uj(R) = ­.
The next rule satis¯es all the axioms except for e±ciency.3
Equal division rule, E: For each R 2 RN and each i 2 N , Ei(R) ´ ­=n.
2We refer to Thomson (2005) for a survey on various characterizations of the uniform rule.
3This rule is characterized by Bochet and Sakai (2007) on the basis of a strong implementability
condition.
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2.3 Binary relations
This subsection introduces some standard de¯nitions on binary relations.
Partial ordering. A binary relation % on a set A is a partial ordering if it satis¯es:
² Re°exivity : For each a 2 A, a % a,
² Transitivity : For each a; b; c 2 A, [a % b and b % c] implies a % c,
² Anti-symmetry : For each a; b 2 A, [a % b and b % a] implies a = b.
Then a pair (A;%) is called a partially ordered set.
Linear ordering. A binary relation % on a set A is a linear ordering if it is a
partial ordering that satis¯es:
² Completeness : For each a; b 2 A, a % b or b % a.
Then a pair (A;%) is called a linearly ordered set.
Lattice theoretic notions. Consider a partial ordering % on a set A.
² Join: Given B µ A, an element a 2 A is the join of B for % if it is the
least maximal of B according to %; that is, (i) for each b 2 B, a % b and
(ii) for each a0 2 A, [a0 % b for each b 2 B] implies a0 % a.
² Meet : Similarly, an element a 2 A is the meet of B for % if it is the
greatest minimal of B; that is, (i) for each b 2 B, b % a and (ii) for each
a0 2 A, [b % a0 for each b 2 B] implies a % a0.
² Lattice: A partially ordered set (A;%) is a lattice if for each a; b 2 A,
there exist the join and meet of fa; bg for %.
² Complete lattice: A partially ordered set (A;%) is a complete lattice if
for each B µ A, there exist the join and meet of B for %.
If they exist, the join and the meet of B are uniquely determined by anti-
symmetry of %.
Given Y µ X and R 2 RN , the dominance relation on Y , dom[R], is de¯ned to
be the binary relation on Y such that for each x; y 2 Y ,
x dom[R] y () [xi Ri yi 8i 2 N ]:
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We shall analyze the order structure of any set G µ F . The dominance relation
on G is denoted by dom, which is de¯ned by, for each f; g 2 G ,
f dom g () [f(R) dom[R] g(R) 8R 2 RN ]:
Note that dom is a partial ordering on G . In particular, we denote by F e µ F
the set of envy-free and peak-only rules and by dome the dominance relation on F e,
and by F es µ F the set of envy-free, peak-only, and strategy-proof rules and by
domes the dominance relation on F es. These notations will appear in the proofs of
Theorems 1 and 2.
3 Characterizations
We o®er a series of propositions that characterize certain geometric properties or
axiomatic relations concerning convex envy-free allocations. To do so, it is conve-
nient to denote by C(R) µ X the set of convex envy-free allocations for R. These
propositions will be ¯nalized into our main theorems.
Proposition 1. An allocation x 2 X is convex envy-free for R 2 RN if and only if
for each i 2 N ,
xi < pi =) xi = x;
pi < xi =) xi = x:
Proof. It is easy to check the \if" part. Let us prove the \only if" part. For each
i 2 N with xi < pi, if xi < x, then a Pi xi for each a 2 (xi; x), a contradiction to
convex envy-freeness. Hence, xi < pi implies xi = x. Similarly, we can show that
pi < xi implies xi = x.
The variance function is a function var : RN+ ! R+ de¯ned by, for each x 2 X,
var(x) ´ 1
n
X
i2N
µ
xi ¡ ­
n
¶2
:
The second proposition clari¯es how convex envy-free allocations can be mutually
compared in view of variance or dominance.
Proposition 2. For every R 2 RN and every x; y 2 C(R),
x · y () y · x () var(x) ¸ var(y) () x dom[R] y; (C1)
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x = y () x = y () var(x) = var(y) () x = y; (C2)
U(R) dom[R] x dom[R] E(R): (C3)
Proof. See, the Appendix.
The fact that the variance of the uniform allocation is larger than that of any
other convex envy-free allocation is ¯rst shown by Chun (2000). This is a converse
implication to a result by Schummer and Thomson (1997) which states that the
variance of the uniform allocation is always smaller than that of any other e±cient
allocation. (C3) is ¯rst obtained by Kesten (2006, Proposition 3). Kesten (2006,
pp. 199{200) also mentions a procedure that obtains all convex envy-free allocations
from the equal division allocation, and then points out that all convex envy-free
allocations are Pareto ranked. Our Proposition 2 can be seen as a completion of their
arguments that o®ers full details of relations among convex envy-free allocations.
Proposition 3. For each R;R0 2 RN with p = p0, C(R) = C(R0).
Proof. It su±ces to show that for each R;R0 2 RN with p = p0 and each x 2 C(R),
we have x 2 C(R0). To do so, we shall prove that, given any i 2 N and any a 2 [x; x],
xi R
0
i a. If xi = pi, then xi = p
0
i, so that xi R
0
i a. If pi < xi, then p
0
i < xi = x by
Proposition 1, so that xi R
0
i a. If xi < pi, then x = xi < p
0
i by Proposition 1, so that
xi R
0
i a. Therefore, x 2 C(R0) in all cases.
Proposition 3 does not imply that all convex envy-free rules are peak-only, since
the choice of one allocation from the same set C(R) = C(R0) may depend on informa-
tion other than peaks. However, the next result shows that, under mild conditions,
convex envy-freeness in fact implies peak-only.
Proposition 4. If a rule is convex envy-free, strategy-proof for same peaks, and
non-bossy for same peaks, then it is peak-only.
Proof. Let f be any convex envy-free, strategy-proof for same peaks, and non-bossy
for same peaks rule. By non-bossiness for same peaks, it su±ces to show that
for each R 2 RN , i 2 N , and each R0i 2 R with pi = p0i, we have fi(R) =
fi(R
0
i; R¡i). If fi(R) = pi, then by strategy-proofness for same peaks, fi(R
0
i; Ri) = pi.
Consider the case fi(R) 6= fi(R0i; R¡i). By strategy-proofness for same peaks, either
fi(R) < pi < fi(R
0
i; R¡i) or fi(R
0
i; R¡i) < pi < fi(R). We only consider the subcase
fi(R) < pi < fi(R
0
i; R¡i), since the other subcase can be parallely shown. Then
Proposition 1 implies
f(R) = fi(R) < fi(R
0
i; R¡i) = f(R
0
i; R¡i);
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but this contradicts the de¯nition of allocations.
The next result by Kesten (2006, Proposition 1) is somewhat a converse of Propo-
sition 4. We give a proof for completeness.
Proposition 5. If a rule is envy-free and peak-only, then it is convex envy-free.
Proof. Let f be an envy-free and peak-only rule. Pick any R 2 RN . By Proposi-
tion 1, we need to show that pi < fi(R) implies fi(R) = f(R) and fi(R) < pi implies
fi(R) = f(R). In the case pi < fi(R), if fj(R) < fi(R) for some j, then, whenever
R0i is such that p
0
i = pi and fj(R) P
0
i fi(R), i envies j under (R
0
i; R¡i) by peak-only,
a contradiction. The parallel proof applies to the case fi(R) < pi.
We are now in a position to o®er our ¯rst main theorem:
Theorem 1. The following three statements on any rule f are equivalent:
(i) f is envy-free and peak-only;
(ii) f is convex envy-free, strategy-proof for same peaks, and non-bossy for same
peaks;
(iii) There exists a function g : [0;­]N ! X such that for each R 2 RN and each
i 2 N ,
fi(R) = gi(p); (G1)
pi < gi(p) =) gi(p) = g(p); (G2)
gi(p) < pi =) gi(p) = g(p): (G3)
Furthermore, the set of these rules is a complete lattice with respect to the domi-
nance relation, whose greatest, least elements are the uniform rule, the equal division
rule, respectively.
Proof. The equivalence between (i) and (ii) follows from Propositions 4 and 5. The
equivalence between (i) and (iii) follows from Proposition 1.
We next show that (F e; dome) is a complete lattice. Let G µ F e. De¯ne the
rule
W
G by, for each R 2 RN , _
G (R) ´ x;
where x is chosen such that x 2 C(R) and
x = inf
g2G
g(R):
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Note that the existence of x follows from the compactness of C(R) and the unique-
ness of x follows from Proposition 2. Thus
W
G is well-de¯ned. Obviously,
W
G is
the unique least upper bound of G . The unique greatest lower bound of G can be
parallely found. Thus (F e; dome) is a complete lattice.
The fact that the uniform, the equal division rules are the greatest, least elements
of (F e; dome), respectively, immediately follows from Proposition 2.
Thomson (1994, Lemma 1) shows that the uniform rule is the only e±cient,
envy-free, and peak-only rule. The equivalence between (i) and (iii) in Theorem 1
clari¯es what happens if e±ciency is dropped from the list of Thomson's axioms.
Theorem 1 also implies that, under envy-freeness and peak-only, the uniform rule
can be selected without caring who gains or loses from the choice of rules, since
everyone gains by the use of the uniform rule independent of their preferences.
Given Theorem 1, a natural question is if there is any interesting sublattice. We
consider this question for the strategy-proof subclass.
Theorem 2. The following three statements on any rule f are equivalent:
(i) f is envy-free, strategy-proof, and peak-only;
(ii) f is convex envy-free, strategy-proof, and non-bossy for same peaks;
(iii) For every i 2 N , there exist two functions hi; hi : [0;­]Nnfig ! [0;­] such that
for each R 2 RN ;
fi(R) = med[pi; hi(p¡i); hi(p¡i)]; (H1)
pi < hi(p¡i) =) med[pi; hi(p¡i); hi(p¡i)] = min
j2N
med[pj; hj(p¡j); hj(p¡j)]; (H2)
hi(p¡i) < pi =) med[pi; hi(p¡i); hi(p¡i)] = max
j2N
med[pj; hj(p¡j); hj(p¡j)]: (H3)
Furthermore, the set of these rules is a complete lattice with respect to the domi-
nance relation, whose greatest, least elements are the uniform rule, the equal division
rule, respectively.
Proof. The equivalence between (i) and (ii) follows from Propositions 4 and 5. One
can easily show that (iii) implies (i).
Let us prove that (i) implies (iii). Pick any envy-free, strategy-proof, and peak-
only rule f and let g : [0;­]N ! X be the associated function satisfying the condi-
tions in (iii) of Theorem 1. For each i 2 N , de¯ne two functions hi; hi : [0;­]Nnfig !
[0;­] by, for every p¡i 2 [0;­]Nnfig,
hi(p¡i) ´ gi(0; p¡i);
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hi(p¡i) ´ gi(­; p¡i):
By strategy-proofness, i has no incentive to report peak ­ when her true peak is zero,
and hence hi(p¡i) · hi(p¡i). Similarly, one can easily show by strategy-proofness
that pi < hi(p¡i) implies fi(R) = hi(p¡i) and hi(p¡i) < pi implies fi(R) = hi(p¡i).
Next, if hi(p¡i) < pi < hi(p¡i), then by strategy-proofness and peak-only, pi = fi(R).
In either case, we obtain fi(R) = med[pi; hi(p¡i); hi(p¡i)], meaning that (H1) holds.
Then (H2) and (H3) immediately follow from Theorem 1.
We next establish the complete lattice structure of F es with respect to the
dominance relation. Let G µ F es. By Theorem 1, there uniquely exist the join and
meet of G ,
W
G ;
V
G 2 F e, respectively. To prove that (F es; domes) is a complete
lattice, it su±ces to show that
W
G ;
V
G are strategy-proof. For each i 2 N and each
R 2 RN , by de¯nition of the join,_
Gi(R) Ri gi(R) 8g 2 G : (1)
For each i 2 N , each R 2 RN , and each R0i 2 R, by strategy-proofness,
gi(R) Ri gi(R
0
i; R¡i) 8g 2 G : (2)
For each i 2 N , each R 2 RN , and each R0i 2 R, (1) and (2) together imply_
Gi(R) Ri gi(R
0
i; R¡i) 8g 2 G ;
and then by de¯nition of
W
Gi(R0i; R¡i) and continuity of Ri,_
Gi(R) Ri
_
Gi(R
0
i; R¡i):
Thus
W
G is strategy-proof. We can similarly show that
V
G is strategy-proof, too.
Therefore, (F es; domes) is a complete lattice.
4 Conclusion
We characterized envy-free and peak-only rules and clari¯ed the complete lattice
structure of the class of these rules. We also imposed strategy-proofness to the
rules and then identi¯ed functional forms of the rules and again found the complete
lattice structure of the strategy-proof subclass. These results enable us to easily
compare any two such rules in view of dominance relations and suggest how strong
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the position of the uniform rule is and how weak the position of the equal division
rule. In general, this kind of easy-to-compare relations is rarely observed, except
for two-sided matching problems (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). Thus results
like ours are rather infrequent. In the theorems, we found the existence of certain
functions characterizing rules, but did not clarify concrete forms of the functions.
Since they seem to have non-trivial complicated forms, obtaining simpler forms by
imposing additional axioms is of interest as a future research.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in several lemmas.
Lemma 1. For each R 2 RN and each x 2 C(R), if x < x, then for each i 2 N ,
xi = x () pi · x; (3)
xi = x () x · pi: (4)
Proof. We only prove (3), since (4) can be shown by a parallel way. If xi = x but
x < pi, then xi < pi. By Proposition 1, xi = x, a contradiction to x < x. Next, if
pi · x but x < xi, then pi < xi, a contradiction to Proposition 1.
Lemma 2. For each R 2 RN , each x 2 C(R), and each i 2 N ,
x · pi · x =) pi = xi; (5)
x < xi < x =) pi = xi: (6)
Proof. We only prove (5), since (6) can be shown by a parallel way. By a con-
traposition argument, suppose that pi 6= xi. Consider the case pi < xi. Then
by Proposition 1, xi = x, so pi < x. Next consider the case xi < pi. Then by
Proposition 1, xi = x, so x < pi.
Lemma 3. For each R 2 RN and each x; y 2 C(R), if x = y, then x = y.
Proof. Assume x = y. If x = x or y = y, then by feasibility, x = E(R) = y. Hence,
let us consider the case x < x and y < y. Without loss of generality, we can assume
x · y. Let
N(x) ´ fi 2 N : pi · xg ;
N(y) ´ ©i 2 N : pi · yª ;
N(x) ´ fi 2 N : x · pig ;
N(y) ´ fi 2 N : y · pig :
Note that N(y) µ N(x).
Since x = y is assumed, we have N(x) = N(y), and by Lemma 1,
xi = x = y = yi 8 i 2 N(x): (7)
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By Lemma 2,
xi = pi = yi 8 i 2 N n (N(x) [N(x)): (8)
By Lemmas 1 and 2,
xi = x · pi = yi 8 i 2 N(x) nN(y): (9)
By Lemma 1,
xi = x · y = yi 8 i 2 N(y): (10)
Since
P
i2N xi =
P
i2N yi, (7){(10) together imply x = y.
Lemma 4. For each R 2 RN and each x; y 2 C(R), if x < y, then y < x.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist R 2 RN and x; y 2 C(R) such
that x < y and x · y. By feasibility, x < y · x · y and y < y. By Lemmas 1 and
2,
pi · x =) xi = x < y = yi; (11)
x < pi · y =) xi = pi · y = yi; (12)
y < pi · x =) xi = pi = yi; (13)
x < pi · y =) xi = x < pi = yi; (14)
y < pi =) xi = x · y = yi: (15)
For j 2 N such that xj = x, Lemma 1 implies pj · x, so xj < yj. Hence,
(11){(15) together imply
P
i2N xi <
P
i2N yi, a contradiction.
Lemma 5. For each R 2 RN and each x; y 2 C(R), if x < y, then x dom[R] y and
not y dom[R] x.
Proof. Immediately follows from Lemmas 1{4.
Proof of Proposition 2. (C1) and (C2) immediately follow from Lemmas 1{5.
(C3) is a direct consequence from (C1) and (C2).
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